Interview by Zora Siebert and Rasmus Randig in July 2025.
From your point of view, what impact will a stronger far right have on relations within the EU, but also in terms of foreign policy?
Rosa Balfour: First of all, we need to be very clear about what we’re talking about. In the media, the terms populism, right-wing populism, radical right, and populist right are used interchangeably. In the past 15 years, there has been a lot of talk about populism, and European politics have indeed seen populism rise. In fact, there’s been a long wave from the 1980s onwards. But today, the challenge comes from political parties of radical right, by which I mean parties belonging to the far right, which are democratic but illiberal. They have done very well in the elections to the European Parliament, and taken together, they make up a quarter of the vote. However, they continue to be split into different groups. It remains to be seen how influential they will actually be.
Considering the European Parliament, but also possible majorities in the European Council ...
… today there are eight governments in the European Council that include the radical right, be it leading a coalition, supporting a coalition or a government, or as the party in charge, like in Hungary. In a few days [with the new government in the Netherlands], it could potentially be nine. That is a quarter of the European Council, and that makes a difference. It means that the radical right can form a blocking minority. It means there is a potential for the radical right to shape European politics in an unprecedented way. We haven’t seen it so far because they are divided, but the situation could change.
In which direction could EU foreign policy be headed in this scenario?
There are a few things these parties agree on. They’re all nationalist, they’re all anti-immigration, and they’re all deeply Eurosceptic. The combination of the three can mean that anti-immigration policies will continue: fortifying the external border, deterring immigration, and pursuing morally dubious deals with third countries, even if they are authoritarian states. Nobody is shocked about it anymore because it's been happening for ten years, and it will likely continue.
How do you explain the rise of the extreme right?
There is a proliferation of explanations in the media. We can group dominant narratives into two wider categories. One is the economic argument about globalization, how it has brought about increasing inequality, the «left behind», and the transformation of social classes. The other big narrative is about culture and identity, the fear of immigration, the fear that immigration is destroying our cultures, such as the «Great Replacement» theory. These are big meta explanations.
And do these explanations hold up?
Yet, if you look at the map to see where populism and the radical right have been on the rise, there’s no necessary empirical correlation between these explanations and what is happening on the ground. In other words, these explanations are not backed by empirical research. Populism grew in affluent countries, such as in Scandinavia, and in places where immigration is not an issue, such as Hungary. These explanations do not shed sufficient light on to why today our democracies are challenged by the rise of the radical right.
Which developments are important to understand the rise of the radical right?
We should look at the 1980s as the starting point of a gradual erosion of our democratic systems. Among the many developments, political parties became less representative of their traditional bases, their membership started to shrink, eventually leading to a gap between political elites and the electorates, real or perceived.
At a macro level, governance has been transformed by globalization and European integration. A number of competencies and decisions are taken beyond the national level. Power and decision-making has shifted away from the national and local levels.
Does that also mean that there has been a lack of representation of citizens in governance?
Exactly. To give you an example, the Fratelli d’Italia are a post-fascist party with deep roots in fascism that has expanded its electorate. Its electorate has ballooned from six percent to more than 20 percent. It’s not that everybody who has voted for them has suddenly decided that they like the fascist ideology. People in Italy were dissatisfied with all the other political parties and voted for change.
There is a disillusionment with democracy, but there are also examples of civic activism. Politics has failed to link up with these new examples of civic activism.
So we need to identify democracy entry points at the local level?
Yes. But let’s be clear. There is a disillusionment with democracy, but there are also examples of civic activism. Politics has failed to link up with these new examples of civic activism. I do think that beyond the big trends, such as globalization or perceptions of identity under threat, we have a far more mundane difficulty in the relationship between citizens and the institutions of representative democracy. We really need to think more creatively about multi-level democracy, how decisions are taken at the local, regional, state, and the European levels, as well as at the international level. To give just one example: Because of the rise of the radical right, the EU has been pursuing defensive migration policies. But often, the problems with immigration are tied to the local provision of services, such as education and housing. These are best dealt with at the local level, not by paying third countries to patrol our borders. There is a disconnect between the nature of the challenge and the governance solutions to address it.
You argue that the long-term erosion of democracy is the cause of the rise of far right parties. But these parties also challenge democracy, don’t they?
Once in power, these parties are showing greater confidence than in the past in undermining democratic institutions and practices. Secondly, they are paying far more attention to cultural issues. If you look at the policies of these parties, when they get into government, be it local government or national government, they really are working hard on the politics of culture, identity, memory, and history. They want to tell a different story. Often, it’s a story of victimhood, to which many people can relate emotionally. They are crafting a narrative that presents an alternative to what they consider to be a narrative that has been decreed by liberal, cosmopolitan elites. This is why culture has become a battleground for the radical right.
Finally, these parties are getting better at linking up internationally.
Exactly. There is a «radical right international,» and it's not just in Europe. They have connections, obviously, with Russia, but also with other actors. Traditionally, because of their nationalism, these parties have been overwhelmingly focused on domestic issues. Now they are expanding their international connections, learning from each other’s experiences, and developing foreign policy positions. This is new.
What mistakes has liberal democracy been making in handling these groups?
We definitely should not label people voting for the radical right as ignorant people! We must rather question ourselves and our assumptions and not assume that this is all about protest votes. Look at France, where one third of the French people vote for Rassemblement National, which is a very deeply illiberal party with a strong authoritarian streak. We need to understand that one third of the French people think a soft form of authoritarianism is okay. This cannot be dismissed as protest politics. Dismissing it has not prevented the growth of these parties. A lot of mistakes have been made by liberal democracy in handling the rise of the radical right.
Why do you argue that democracy is important to foreign policy? Realists would say that security is more important than democracy?
Having looked at both security and democracy for a long time, I have observed that there are two communities of expertise and not enough linkages between them. If you talk about democracy in the foreign policy community, you are considered a wishy-washy liberal talking about minor details. The world is all about geopolitics, realpolitik, security, hard interests. Then you go to the other community that is active on democracy issues and talk about security, and there you are seen as a conservative. My take on this is: If democracy fails inside the European Union, it’s going to have consequences on foreign policy.
Can you give us an example?
For instance, Orbán has been undermining the decision-making process in the European Union on Ukraine and on defense. Hungary has been systematically sabotaging EU foreign policy with respect to some key interests: By supporting Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s aggression, the EU is actually relying on Ukraine for its own security. It is not a wishy-washy liberal position to state that Hungary has increasingly been the Trojan Horse of Russia and China inside the European Union. That’s very real politics. And why is Orbán doing it? It’s because he has degraded his country’s democracy. And in order to maintain his power at home and his leverage in the European Union, he needs to pursue nationalistic anti-EU politics. Otherwise, he could be ousted or isolated in some way or another. Orbán now is betting on having more like-minded countries sitting at the table in the European Council. Recent electoral results have strengthened the number of radical right governments in Europe. Orbán is also hoping that Donald Trump will win the elections in the United States in November.
In a democracy, civil society plays a big part, both within the European Union and in countries that are candidates for accession. Where do you see the biggest challenges in supporting them?
The first is that authoritarian actors have increased their game in disrupting democracies elsewhere. They are increasingly using digital tools to do that. The EU must take measures to protect and defend democracy from external interference. Civil society plays a fundamental role in transforming the candidate countries into vibrant democracies fit to join the EU. But over the past few years, EU leaders have not offered enough support to the forces committed to political reform in these countries. If the next round of enlargement is driven by geopolitics rather than by democratic change, this will be to the detriment of the EU as a whole.
Paying lip service to key values, such as multilateralism, a rules-based order, international institutions, human rights, and democracy is not enough. The EU needs to support civil society more effectively through its various programmes.
Isn’t it also ultimately also a financial question?
Ultimately, the EU needs to bring the candidate countries into the digital and Green transformation of the economy that it is pursuing for itself. Imagining a large-scale innovation of the European continent and its economic model ought to frame the way in which EU enlargement is pursued. It’s in the interest of the EU that the countries joining it are law-abiding democracies capable of sharing the political and economic model that has been successful for decades.
How do you think the EU can strike a balance between the need for transparency and protection against unlawful external interference while maintaining an independent and critical civil society?
Authoritarian countries have certainly upped their game in disrupting democracies through interference. There certainly is a need to be more alert, especially in the information space and with respect to the emerging political actors on the radical right. Russia and the political party United Russia, for instance, have been financially supporting far-right parties in Europe. There is a need to strengthen and sharpen EU tools, but I think there are a couple of bigger conceptual points to be made.
The issue of disinformation is not just about malign interference and people believing fake news. The media business model has been in crisis for many years; its problems that stem from technological change have created the space for disinformation. The business model of media, its financing, the need to invest in fact-checking, and to support educational approaches that encourage youth to be discerning all need to be addressed.
We need to understand that disinformation is not just that comes from the outside. It is within our societies. We must come to terms with the fact that anti-Semitism is accepted in many quarters, islamophobia is spreading, and they, too, are contributing to poisoning the information ecosystem.
My final point is reiterating what I said earlier. It’s not just about what the EU can do. National politics and local politics also need to play a greater role.
* The interview was conducted in early July.
Rosa Balfour is the director of Carnegie Europe. Her areas of expertise include European politics, institutions, as well as foreign and security policy. Her current research focuses on the relationship between domestic political developments and Europe’s global role.
Zora Siebert is head of the program for Democracy and Digital Policy in the EU at the Brussels Office of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. She holds a German-French Master’s degree in European Studies and International Relations from the Universities of Passau and Strasbourg. Previously, she worked for a European MP on issues of data protection, IT security, and artificial intelligence.
Rasmus Randig is Head of Program for International Democracy and Deputy Head of Unit for Global Support for Democracy and Human Rights at the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung in Brussels. He studied Economic and Social History in Glasgow and Constance and worked in Crisis Prevention and Stabilization at the German Foreign Office.